The common pattern across all of these seems to be filesystem and network ACLs enforced by the OS, not a separate kernel or hardware boundary. A determined attacker who already has code execution on your machine could potentially bypass Seatbelt or Landlock restrictions through privilege escalation. But that is not the threat model. The threat is an AI agent that is mostly helpful but occasionally careless or confused, and you want guardrails that catch the common failure modes - reading credentials it should not see, making network calls it should not make, writing to paths outside the project.
Now, what I can do is push this image to a self-hosted image registry (with Harbor for example) and make this image accessible. There are 2 reasons why I want to do this:
Instruct Opus to minimize differences between agentic implementation and known good implementation without causing more than a 5% speed regression on any benchmarks。业内人士推荐91视频作为进阶阅读
В России указали на ключевой момент в уничтожении украинских новейших ракет «Фламинго»«ВХ»: Из-за дальности «Фламинго» могут запускаться ВСУ из глубокого тыла。搜狗输入法下载是该领域的重要参考
url: https://example.com/hello。业内人士推荐heLLoword翻译官方下载作为进阶阅读
作业迁移：主流调度引擎自动转换与血缘对齐